Criticism, Contact With Reality and Truth by Sanders, Andy F.,
24
Criticism, Contact with Reality and Truth
Andy F. Sanders
ABSTRACT Key Words:  Michael Polanyi, tacit knowledge, dogmatism, criticism, Background, J.Searle, truth,
contact with reality.
Partly in reply to D. Cannon’s critique of my analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s post-critical theory of
knowledge, I argue that there are good reasons for not appropriating Polanyi’s programme of self-identication
and the confessional rhetoric which may be derived from it. Arguing that “post-critical”should not be identified
with an uncritical dogmatism, I then go on to suggest that the theory of tacit knowing had best be elaborated
further by drawingon the work of J. Searle and M. Johnson. Finally, I make use of E. Meek’s account of the
notion of “contact with reality”to highlight the Polanyian criteria of truth.
I. Introduction
Dale Cannon’s musings on my account of Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge are challenging not only
because they made me reconsider certain choices I made in expounding and reconstructing that theory, but also because
he claims that my appropriation of post-critical epistemology in terms of analytical philosophy is in several respects
misguided. As a consequence, my reconstruction is obscuring fundamental Polanyian insights. As I understand them,
Cannon’s objections to it can be summarized as follows:
(1) It remains tributary to the critical (analytical) tradition by differentiating the content of Polanyi’s epistemology
from his style.
(2) It fails to capture the significance of Polanyi’s proposal for “a post-critical rhetoric for epistemology.”
(3) It misconstrues tacit knowing as representational and thus reduces it to a form of propositional knowing that
(or believing that).
(4) It fails to do justice to Polanyi’s notion of existential or relational truth and thus leaves the relationship between
propositional and relational truth unexplained.
Surely, these are no small charges. Obviously, my account leaves out certain aspects of the theory of personal
knowledge. For example, I do not fully discuss ideas which are not directly relevant to my aim, namely, “to clarify and
develop aspects of [Polanyi’s] work in connection with some contemporary positions within analytical philosophy.”1
As Polanyi’s own aims and motives are not the primary subject of my book, my concern is, rather, “with what he says,
than with why he is saying it.”2 It is this restriction which I think gives rise to most of Cannon’s misgivings. As will
turn out, however, his critique is not only concerned with what is insufficiently accentuated or left out, but directed
at actual elements of my account as well.25
Part of my aim in this paper is to locate the source of our apparent disagreement. I suspect it arises from quite
different conceptions of the task of philosophy and thus from different interpretations of Polanyi’s endeavour, or, at
least, from emphasizing quite different strands in it. Since Cannon’s objections, for obvious reasons, are not worked
out fully, I will strengthen them whenever this seems called for, even if this makes them more robust and severe than
they may be intended.
Discussing the objections in the order given, I will argue against the first charge that critique has a vital role
even in post-critical philosophy. Regarding charge (2), I will argue, first, that Polanyi’s post-critical rhetoric can be
developed in two directions, an existentialist and traditionalist one and, second, that I opt for Polanyi’s traditionalism
for epistemological reasons. Objection (3), I believe, is based on a misunderstanding of my position. In the last section,
I will deal with (4) and Cannon’s interesting and challenging proposal to conceive of Polanyian truth as relational and
existential. I will not merely defend my own account of Polanyi’s conception of truth, but I will also develop and
strengthen it further.
II. Tacit Knowing and Criticism
Cannon’s critique seems to be motivated at least in part by certain misgivings about the adequacy of my
analytical approach. This is not really surprising, for many strands of early analytical philosophy can be associated
with the objectivist positions Polanyi was criticizing in the fifties and sixties. However, I believe that much of analytical
philosophy (broadly so called) has moved away from logical postivist assumptions under the influence of (the later)
Wittgenstein, Searle, Putnam, MacIntyre and others. In contrast, Cannon is clearly doubtful of analytical philosophy
as a means of appropriating Polanyian insights. In his view, my reconstruction of the theory of personal knowledge
not only leaves our “critical intellectual sensibility intact’, but it also ignores Polanyi’s fundamental challenge to the
assumption underlying this sensibility, namely that “(in principle) one can unproblematically and neutrally specify a
propositional content of any thought or intention which is then subject to critical reflection” (p. 22).
In connection with this double claim two complex issues can be raised. First, I take it that a neutral specification
of a person’s thoughts is problematic because these thoughts cannot be isolated from the context or the manner in
which that person, so to speak, “has”this thought, the meaning it has for her. Second, Cannon also suggests that I
have obscured two fundamental properties of tacit knowing, its being both unspecifiable and a-critical. Leaving the
first issue for further discussion in the next section, the point underlying the second one seems to be that my approach
includes a kind of pan-criticism: “because everything must be subject to critical reflection in the modern cartesian mode,
everything is to be construed as a propositional content”(p. 22). According to Cannon, I remain trapped, willy nilly
perhaps, in precisely the objectivist modes of thought Polanyi’s post-critical enterprise is directed against. What to
say to this?
To begin with, I would like to emphasize that I nowhere uphold, explicitly or implicitly, a comprehensive
criticism which says that everything must be subject to critical reflection. Cannon’s conception of analytical philosophy
as aiming only at criticism seems overly narrow. In contrast, I see its goal as conceptual clarification and innovation,
not in the hope of reaching allegedly “clear and distinct ideas”or some other sort of epistemic “foundation,” but in order
to resolve questions, perplexities and obscurities in our thinking.26
What is wrong with a critical sensibility? As I try to give full credit to the essential characteristics of tacit
knowing as both unspecifiable and a-critical and as I find myself agreeing with nearly everything Canon has to say
about the nature of tacit knowing, it seems that we are holding quite different views of the viability of critical analysis.
Obviously, the possibility of such analysis depends on the specifiability of particulars. If tacit knowing were completely
unspecifiable at all times, criticism of tacitly functioning particulars would be impossible. But of course, according to
the theory of tacit knowing at least some things known tacitly within a certain context at a particular point in time can,
at least in part, be specified (though not, of course, at the same time).
Cannon appears to acknowledge this when he rejects the view that tacit knowing “might not issue forth in,
or in part be represented by, some propositional content, or be itself a making sense of and an upholding of some
propositional content”(p. 22). Nevertheless, I think that he is to a certain extent playing down the importance of critical
reflection and examination in mastering skills, in understanding and in discovery in general.3 Consider his example of
reliance on a scientific theory. On Cannon’s construal of the role of tacit knowing in scientific inquiry, we start by
considering a theory critically, but come to rely upon it a-critically once we have recognized it as true. The theory is
then relied upon “so as to put is into contact with ... reality”(p. 22). Accordingly, Cannon distinguishes between the
mediating capacity of a theory (when relied upon confidently) and its representational capacity (when focally attended
to as an explicit content).
As such the distinction is sound and I also agree that we cannot use, apply, or rely on, a theory and critically
examine it at the same time. However, Cannon comes close to saying that tacit awareness and focal attention are not
only mutually exclusive at a particular time, but also all, or almost all, of the time. It seems as if he is saying that once
you have come to believe in a theory as true, paying attention to its particulars will easily destroy your confident reliance
on it.
But what of the host of theories in the history of science which turned out to be mistaken, no matter how much
they were relied on or how strongly they were believed in? Of course, no inquiry or believing is without risk, as Polanyi
points out. But when we are told by philosophers of science, Polanyi himself included, that all our theories, even the
best ones, are engulfed in a sea of anomalies, surely the element of risk (and error) should not be thought of lightly.
It is not enough just to say that now foundationalism has collapsed for us, fallible humans, there is no other alternative
than to go from where we are. The problem is not that there is no alternative but rather that there is a plurality of alternative
theories, views and ideas, many of which are at odds with our own.
This problem only deepens when we consider the religious or secular world-views to which we are committed.
Scientists may strongly believe in a scientific theory or think they are simply working on it, they may stake their careers
on that theory or they may be more cautious. But where human flourishing and human destiny is concerned, the stakes
may even be higher. A religious example in this connection is Johannes Climacus who, acknowledging that “[w]ithout
risk, no faith,” admonishes himself that in order to keep the faith “I must ... see to it that in the objective uncertainty
I am “out on 70,000 fathoms of water” and still have faith.”4 Another example, involving a different kind of risk, would
be Polanyi who, professing that all that we believe to be true and good may be totally mistaken (PK 404), nevertheless
maintains “that we may firmly believe what we might conceivably doubt; and may hold to be true what might conceivably
be false”(PK 312). Further examples could easily be multiplied. My point is that precisely because so much depends
on what we are committed to, faith, whether religious or secular, and criticism should be seen as interdependent. In the
words of Basil Mitchell: “Without faith in an established tradition criticism has nothing to fasten on; without criticism27
the tradition ceases in the end to have any purchase on reality.”5
The epistemological issue here can be put in the form of a familiar dilemma. To put it crudely: should we minimize
(the risk of) error or should we maximize truth? Of course, we would like to do both. But by minimizing error we run the
danger of keeping truth out as well, whereas maximizing truth may well lead to taking all sorts of error on board.
Foundationalist philosophers chose the first horn by trying to find a collection of incorrigible, indubitable, preferably
even infallible basic beliefs on which the edifice of knowledge could be erected. In spite of all their attempts to minimize
error, however, truth became progressively harder to come by.
As to the other horn of the dilemma, it seems quite natural to interpret Polanyi’s invitation to dogmatism (PK
268) as an attempt to break it. In a sense, it can be seen as an attempt to maximize truth while at the same time allowing
for the possibility of complete error. Since the invitation plays a central role in the fiduciary programme, the question
of how we should understand it is of vital importance. I will come back to this issue in the next section, but as far as
the role of criticism is concerned, I think it would be misconceiving the invitation to think that it implies that criticism
as such is the high road to self-doubt, scepticism, nihilism, and what not. On my account of post-critical philosophy,
critical analysis is of vital importance both after the acceptance of some theory as true and while relying on it with an
eye to seek for more truth or to improve our bodily and intellectual skills in general (provided that its results can be
reintegrated into the original focal whole).6
As Cannon does not deny the importance of critical reflection as such, have I not been been labouring the
obvious? But then, again, what is wrong with a critical posture? Could the point of his objection be the extent to which
my account remains focussed on certain particulars of the theory of tacit knowing? On this reading, his charge would
be that I do not maintain the proper balance between analysis (attending to the particulars) and integration (attending
from the particulars). Concentrating too much on particulars, the overall significance of the theory of tacit knowing gets
obscured because it precludes the meaningful reintegration of those particulars. If so, an analytical approach and its
concomitant “critical”and detached posture, might even be a case of what Polanyi calls “destructive analysis”(cf. PK
50ff.). This leads us to objection (2) which accuses me of failing to capture the true significance of Polanyi’s post-critical
rhetoric.
III. A New Epistemological Rhetoric?
According to Cannon, Polanyi’s post-critical insights require that “our very way of doing epistemology be
changed”and that “[t]hings cannot simply go on as they have in the past”(p. 21). But what does he mean by that?
Fortunately, we have a clue to what he is getting at refers to a passage where I defend Polanyi against Alan Musgrave’s
claim that Polanyi’s epistemology leads to solipsism. In that context, I suggest that Musgrave is misinterpreting certain
peculiarities of Polanyi’s style and I then go on to put the fiduciary formulation of the task of philosophy “into a more
neutral mode of speech.”7
Recall that according to Cannon it is not possible to specify the content of a person’s belief neutrally. Extracting
the content of a belief out of its proper context without reintegrating it, deprives it of its meaning. Applying this to my
reconstruction of Polanyi, it may then be suggested that this is precisely what I am doing: making a split between the
content of his ideas and their significance (as expressed in a particular rhetorical style).28
Assuming that the significance of the theory of personal knowledge lies at least partly in its aims, we find them
expressed in a frequently quoted series of passages. In many of them, liberation from objectivism and restoration of
meaning and confidence are central. For example, liberation from objectivism is achieved by realizing “that we can voice
our ultimate convictions only from within ... the whole system of acceptances that are logically prior to any particular
assertion of our own ...”(PK 267). Accordingly, philosophy for Polanyi now becomes a programme of self-identifica-
tion: “discovering what I truly believe in and ... formulating the convictions I find myself holding.”8 In complete self-
referential coherence, he then reports as his central convictions “that I must conquer my self-doubt”(ibid.) and “that
I am called upon to search for the truth and state my findings”(PK 299). But then his programme of self-identification
may become our programme as well. So the aim is also “to restore to us once more the power for the deliberate holding
of unproven beliefs”(PK 268).
Langford and Poteat have interpreted these self-referential (personal) and summoning expressions in
Personal Knowledge as a deliberately employed “confessional rhetoric”in the line of St. Augustine. According to them,
“this form of confession is precisely the medium for seeking to appreciate how and who one is in order that one may
more fully be so.”9 Assuming that this somewhat resembles the new epistemological rhetoric Cannon is alluding to,
what to think of it?
To begin with, I admit that I did not appropriate either Polanyi’s confessional rhetoric or the programme of
self-identification. With the help of hindsight, let me try to explain why. In the first place, I took my audience to be mainly
analytical non-Polanyians, that is, philosophers who at the time were at most dimly aware of Polanyi’s work, if not deeply
suspicious of the curious mixture of its analytical, phenomenological, pragmatic and existential aspects (and possibly
also of his status as a non-professional philosophe). Telling this audience in a straightforward way that epistemology
after Polanyi cannot be done in the traditional ways any more, seemed to me a rhetorical strategy doomed to failure.
In presenting Polanyi’s ideas to them in current analytical idiom and styles of reasoning, I tried to convey their
intelligibility and plausibility in an indirect way.10
Further, it is obvious that the programme of self-identification does not fit well in the context of a reconstructive
enterprise in epistemology. Analytical philosophy is neither a philosophy of life, nor does it “speak from the heart.”
It has no programme for human flourishing and the most it can do by way of intellectual therapy is conceptual clarification
and innovation. Nevertheless, even in retrospect, I still find myself reluctant to side with Langford, Poteat and, possibly,
also Cannon, in taking the programme of self-identification as the central tenet of Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy.
Notice, though, that this is not to deny that it is one of its tenets and that its further elaboration may be a perfectly
legitimate post-critical undertaking.
Next, and more important, my reluctance is fueled by straightforward epistemological concerns as well. First,
there is the serious issue of Polanyi’s invitation to dogmatism. Should we take it as a plea for existentialist faith and
unconditional commitment, as a summons to a post-foundational traditionalism or, perhaps, as a neo-Wittgensteinian
call for participation in groundless epistemic practices? On the first reading, it seems to me that straightforward
dogmatism in combination with the program of personal self-identification will lead to a position which I find untenable.
What I have in mind are policies and attitudes of sticking to one’s beliefs, theories and world-views in a “come what
may”fashion, either by appeal to revealed or manifest truths (as in fideism) or to allegedly basic beliefs (as in full-blown
or crypto-foundationalism). True is only what is (or may yet become) true-for-me or true-for-us; what is true-for-them,
for “the others,” is of no concern, or, worse, a threat to my or our intellectual existence.   One of the central theses of29
my book is that this kind of dogmatism is untenable and irreconcilable both with Polanyi’s fallibilism and with the
possibility of criticism. Hence my proposal to read Polanyi’s invitation as a methodological maxim, similar to C.S. Peirce’s
principle of tenacity, to stick to our traditions in the face of adverse evidence as long as this is reasonably possible
or no better alternative is available.11 Methodological dogmatism, as I call it, plays a central role in the traditionalist
position which I then proceed to develop in Polanyi’s wake.
A correlated worry is that the programme of self-identification coupled to the requirement to express only our
own ultimate convictions “from within our convictions,” may give epistemology an unduly “egocentric”twist. Polanyi
recognizes this danger when he says that as soon as his fiduciary programme is formulated “it appears to menace itself
with destruction ... for by limiting himself to the expression of his own beliefs, the philosopher may be taken to talk only
about himself ”(PK 299). To prevent the destruction, the theory of commitment is developed around the notions of
responsible belief and universal intent.12
As Cannon rightly points out (p. 21), I am somewhat uncomfortable with the doctrine of commitment. I still
believe that this doctrine can only fulfill its task properly if not only the personal, but also the cultural roots of tacit
knowing are taken into account. The latter not as something additional to the personal, but rather as constitutive of
it. For example, the standards in respect to which we as veracious inquirers hold ourselves responsible, must be self-
set in order to function as such - otherwise they couldn’t even be my (or our) standards. But they are not free floating
and not just there to be picked out at will. Rather, they are embedded in the traditions, the histories and practices to
which we have become affiliated, in which we participate and on which we are desperately dependent.
In sum, for an analytical philosopher, embarking on a confessional rhetoric in the line of an unqualified
dogmatism, would amount to a major intellectual shift in allegiance. As a philosopher of religion, trained in the analytical
tradition, working on the intersection of “reason”and “faith’, I am only too well aware of, and perhaps too self-conscious
about, the tensions between the two realms and the pitfalls awaiting those who think they can work comfortably  in
both of them at the same time.13
IV. The Irreducibility of Tacit Knowing
According to Cannon, “tacit awareness is not itself subject to critical reflection precisely because it is not
representational (hence not propositional)”(p. 22). Having dealt already with the issue of criticism, we now turn to the
claim that tacit knowing is not representational (and thus not propositional), but relational or existential. The relationality
of tacit knowing is elucidated by a distinction between tacit knowing as fiduciary or personal belief in, and explicit
(propositional) knowledge as objective or a-personal belief that.14 Cannon rightly points out that although belief in
includes belief that, it is more. Consequently, belief in (tacit knowing) cannot be reduced to mere assent to some
propositional content on pains of distorting its essential characteristics.
I agree completely with Cannon on this point and I am therefore rather puzzled by the charge. I can only
conclude that he is misreading my position entirely. First, from the fact that I am using abstract entities like propositions
for the purpose of a presentation and elucidation of the theory of tacit knowing, it does not follow that particulars are
in the nature of representations if and when they are attended from or functioning as subsidiaries. They may well be
figurative, auditive, tactile etc., but I present tacit knowing in propositional terms for the purpose of elucidating the
theory of tacit knowing. What better way is there to introduce and convey the epistemological status of tacit knowing30
to analytical philosophers? Thus, propositional (re)presentation is primarily a useful means for clarification, not some
covert ontological thesis about the nature of tacitly held particulars.
Further, it should be noticed that the theory of tacit knowing is itself located at a different level of description
than particular instances of tacit knowing. Why think that a propositional representation of the theory of personal
knowledge as such is mistaken or confused? Whereas on my account tacit knowing remains phenomenologically and
psychologically ubiquitous and irreducible, surely the philosophical theory of tacit knowing is not itself tacit but explicit
and thus susceptible to analysis, critical examination, defense, elaboration, and so forth.
Finally, and most importantly, I do give the non-propositional or quasi-propositional elements in all forms of
knowing their due place. For example, in my reconstruction of the tacit component as involved in utterances of
statements of fact, I emphasize the role of (and degrees of) emotions and feelings in order to clarify what Polanyi means
by his all too brief remarks on the nature of assertions and truth. Later, in a broader context, I employ John Searle’s thesis
of the Background in order to lend further substance to Polanyi’s conception of the tacit component as not only
inherently personal and embodied but as socio-cultural or communal as well.15 The central features of our Background
capacities and stances can be listed thus: they are are pre-intentional, nonrepresentational and they permeate a person’s
intentional Network. Hence, without the Background no intentionality, no directedness of consciousness and, I should
add, no focal awareness and no explicit knowledge of any significance. Far from saying, explicitly or by implication,
that tacit knowing is as such propositional, I am in fact construing it as a vast fund of pre-intentional, non-propositional
stances and capacities.16 This is precisely why I criticize Searle for suggesting that Polanyi’s theory implies that rules
which govern skills function unconsciously as representations.17 This would reduce personal knowing how to a
knowledge by description which, like reducing belief in to belief that, is indeed totally alien to Polanyi’s endeavour.
Of course, nailing my colours rather tightly to Searle’s mast might be a source of further misgivings. For
instance, his thesis of the Background has been criticized by Mark Johnson who argues that it remains objectivist and
that a viable theory of meaning should go beyond Searle’s.18  Although expressing firm agreement on the substantial
points that all meaning is a matter of intentionality and that all meaning is context-dependent, Johnson criticizes Searle
for taking the Background as preintentional and thus not as itself part of meaning. Consequently, imaginative
phenomena or structures, like categorization, image schemata, metaphorical projection, metonymy, polysemy and
semantic change, which Johnson sees as essential to meaning, come to fall outside the scope of adequate theory of
meaning and understanding.19
In retrospect, had I been acquainted with Johnson’s work in time, I would certainly have used it to amplify
my account of the tacit component and to amend the notion of the Background. For Searle’s  earlier speech act theoretical
account of meaning is indeed restricted to linguistic meaning, to be analysed in terms of propositional contents in certain
intentional or psychological modes. In particular, I would have made ample use of Johnson’s notion of non-
propositional meaning, which is richer than Searle’s theory as put forward in Intentionality (1983).
It should be pointed out, though, that Searle recently further elaborated his thesis of the Background in reply
to various criticisms, especially in his The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992). In this book, he develops a theory of
consciousness which comprises quite a few Polanyian concerns, such as the rejection of materialism, the irreducibility
of consciousness, the view of consciousness as a natural biological feature, and commitment to truth of propositions
without having any intentional states with those propositions as content. He still takes the Background as non- or31
preintentional but he now assigns the Background a much broader role: it is now said not only to “enable”linguistic
and perceptual interpretation, but also to “structure”consciousness (by moulding extended sequences of experiences
into “narrative shapes”and “motivational dispositions’) and to “facilitate”certain kinds of readiness of the person and
to “dispose”one to certain sorts of behaviour.20 Whether this brings Searle closer to Johnson or not would have to
be the topic for a separate paper, but I think Johnson is mistaken when he suggests that Searle’s demarcation between
the intentionality of the Network and the preintentionality of the Background is fueled by foundationalist motives.21
Characterizing the Background as “a bedrock of mental capacities ... that form the preconditions for the functioning
of Intentional states,” Searle is using “bedrock”in the familiar Wittgensteinian sense which, of course, is anything but
foundationalist.22
  Where does all this lead us in respect to Cannon’s charge that I am reducing tacit knowing to a form of
propositional knowledge? Again, whether or not there is more to the tacit component than can be covered by the
Searlean Background, the latter is undeniably non-propositional, bodily rooted, and both person and culture relative.
Surely this is enough for my epistemological aim, namely to show in terms intelligible to analytical philosophers that
what is tacitly known is not irremediably private but also intersubjectively shared. So far my reply to Cannon’s third
objection. Let us now see where this brings us in respect to the interpretation of Polanyi’s account of truth.
V. Truth as Contact with Reality
Particularly important seems Cannon’s proposal to interpret Polanyi’s conception of truth primarily as
“relational”in the sense of “relating to reality by making contact with it”(cf. p.23). According to Cannon, “relational”in
this connection is opposed to, or at least more than, merely propositional truth on which he thinks my account is mainly
focussed. Polanyian truth, according to Cannon, “is the achievement of connection in the first person (for oneself)
with ... objective reality (qua recognizable in common to responsible inquirers)” . . . (p. 23). Propositional truth is
subordinate to, and grounded in, this deeper, existential or relational sense of truth.
One way of replying to this would be to point out that an assessment of Polanyi’s ideas of truth largely depends
on what an account of truth is supposed to achieve. Normally, it attempts to answer questions like: “What is (the nature
or meaning of) truth?”(especially the correspondence and the semantic theories), “What are the criteria of truth (or
falsehood)?”(notably coherence and pragmatist accounts) and “How do we use the words ‘true’ (or ‘false’)?”(as in
the relatively recent non-descriptive or performative account).
Polanyi’s account of truth answers in varying degrees of detail each of these issues. In view of his robust
realism, I think it is quite plausible to assume that he remains committed to the common-sense notion of truth as
correspondence or fit with reality, a thesis with which Cannon seems to agree. Polanyi also offers an analysis of “what
we can mean by saying that a factual statement is true”(PK 254) as part of his attempt to reinterpret the ideal of an
impersonally detached truth in order “to allow for the inherently personal character of the act by which truth is
declared”(PK 71). As I try to show in detail, his analysis comes close to P. Strawson’s so-called non-descriptive or
performative theory of truth, according to which to say that a statement is true is not to ascribe a further property to
it, but to endorse, or to express commitment to, its content. Finally, Polanyi also develops an interesting account of
how in scientific inquiry truths can be recognized on a tacit level.
I am not sure how to fit Cannon’s notion of existential truth in this traditional way of questioning, but I guess32
that I am not misrepresenting him by assuming that the notion of “contact”is closely connected to the issue of the criteria
of truth and that the qualification “existential”concerns the meaning of truth.
As regards the criterial or contact sense of truth, I agree with Cannon that it is central to Polanyi’s ideas on
truth and that propositional truth is derived from it. My own reconstruction of the criterial sense of truth, of intuitive
contact with reality, and of the relations between truth, reality and beauty, is mainly confined to the context in which
he develops it, namely the philosophy of science.23 An extensive account of the notions of truth and contact with reality
was already in the offing, namely Esther L. Meek’s dissertation on Polanyi’s realism.24 Since Cannon refers to her work,
let us have a closer look at her account of the experience of contact with reality.
According to Meek, for Polanyi “truth is a matter of contact with reality and as such is personally appraised.”25
The conceptual connection between “truth”and “reality”is very close indeed for, as Meek points out, the criteria of
truth just are the criteria of reality:
contact with reality is a sine qua non: without there having been contact with reality, there can be no truth.
Truth has to do with reality, with the way things actually are. That is why the criteria of reality function as
criteria of truth: they indicate successful contact, and contact is essential to truth.26
Arguing convincingly that if truth lies in contact with reality “it is the tacit component alone which enables the knower
to decide what is true”27, Meek then goes on to clarify the nature of the criteria of reality. According to her, the two
basic Polanyian criteria of reality, and thus of truth, are what she calls the reality criterion and the integrative criterion.
According to the reality criterion,
we recognize successful contact with reality in the course of a discovery or other epistemic
achievement because of the presence of intimations of indeterminate future manifestations (the IFM
Effect), the feeling that the resulting conclusion will go on being confirmed in as yet inconceivable
and surprising ways.28
The IFM Effect accompanies contact with reality and thus indicates the presence of truth to the dicoverer. Whereas
the intimations that make up the IFM Effect have a “prospective indeterminacy,”the integrative criterion consists of
“retrospectively indeterminate clues.” According to the integrative criterion,“contact with reality has been succesfully
made if the epistemic achievement in question consists of “the comprehension of the coherence of largely unspecifiable
particulars.”29
In Meek’s view, the reality criterion and especially the integrative criterion are basic because three further
Polanyian criteria of reality, coherence, rationality and intellectual beauty, “develop out of [them].”30 All three result
from the integrative act of tacit knowing: experiences of coherence are linked with appearance, pattern and order (the
phenomenal aspect of tacit knowing) and the experience of rationality is connected with meaningfulness (the semantic
aspect). Intellectual beauty attaches to theories and is experienced in virtue of the coherence and rationality of those
theories or as an accompaniment of the IMF Effect they exert.31
However, Meek warns us that successful contact reveals “merely an aspect of reality.”32 Reality, according
to Polanyi, is inexhaustive, and so contact with reality is always aspectual and inexhaustive as well. Consequently, to33
attain truth is never to attain the whole truth and nothing but the truth, as Meek rightly emphasizes.33 In this way truth
as contact with reality is reconciled with Polanyi’s fallibilism.
As an account of Polanyi’s criterial sense of truth, Meek’s account of how, according to Polanyi, truth can
be recognized, seems to me perfectly sound and also an important complement to my own account.
VI. Truth as Correspondence
Regarding our second issue, the meaning of truth, I already noted that Cannon and I agree that Polanyi upholds
the common-sense notion of truth as correspondence. On my account, part of this is expressed in Polanyi’s thesis that
the structure of tacit comprehension parallels the structure of what is comprehended (cf. TD 33f.). According to Cannon,
however, I am confusing the epistemological question of correspondence with reality with what he takes to be “the
ontological question of the correspondence between the structure of tacit comprehension ... and the structure of the
comprehensive entity which is its object” (p. 20). I certainly do not deny that Polanyi’s thesis can be construed as an
ontological one but, surely, the epistemological question is just the other side of the same coin.
Consider the following example which is built on an interesting proposal by Meek. She suggests that for
Polanyi the notion of contact replaces the notion of correspondence. On her construal, in the process of discovery,
tacit foreknowing precedes the discovery. When the explicit knowledge of discovery arrives, “we recognize it as
matching or corresponding with the tacit conclusions already reached. Thus discovery comes to us with the conviction
of its being true.”34
Here is the example. When looking at a car in my vicinity, I am more or less aware of the characteristic features
of that car, its being yellow, its having a certain shape, wheels, windows, and so forth. The car is in a certain sense
“more”than that particular aggregate of features. Normally, when I have a visual experience like that, there is a yellow
car in my vicinity. I can express my experience to you by saying “Look, a yellow Alfa Romeo Spider!.” So far the ontology.
What about the parallel structure? Obviously, I am not having something yellow, four-wheeled, etc. in my head or body.
What I have in my mindbody is a visual representation of the car, jointly made up of all the particulars which happen
to be relevant to that particular experience and of which I am more or less, or perhaps not at all, aware. As the car is
“more”than its component parts, my visual representation is “more”than these subsidiaries. So far the parallel structure.
Now it seems to me that if there is not some sort of connection or “contact”between my awareness of the
subsidiaries that make up my visual experience and the actual features of the car, my having that particular visual
experience would become a complete mystery. Nothing depends here on the availability of intersubjective checking
procedures, let alone on “independent access to reality,” that is, access independent of our common conceptions of
cars, colours, etc. On the contrary, it is precisely in and through the use of these conceptions that “contact with reality”is
achieved.  Thus, I uphold my claim that the ontological thesis of corresponding structures has epistemological import
as well, and that the sense of correspondence meant by Polanyi is not one of mirroring (isomorphy or one-one
correspondence), but a more lose one (homomorphy or analogy).
I am not sure whether this is what Cannon has in mind with his notion of existential truth, which, I take it, covers
more than “what is true for me”or “what it means that something is true for me.” This is important because it may be
the way in which we learn to use the word “true’, but it cannot be the whole story and so the traditional questions34
reappear.
In retrospect, my analytical approach to Polanyi’s theory of personal knowing leaves out certain aspects of
his philosophy, in particular the programme of self-identification and the confessional rhetoric deriving from it.
However, I show that there are solid epistemological reasons for caution and that “post-critical”should not be identified
with an uncritical dogmatism. I also indicate how the current accounts of the nature and structure of tacit knowing could
be elaborated further by drawing on, and extending, the work of Searle and Johnson. Finally, I make use of Meek’s
account of the notion of “contact with reality”to expound Polanyi’s criterial sense of truth. In the light of this, I would
not be surprised if Dale Cannon’s misgivings are still largely intact. Still, what this exchange of views between
proponents of quite different philosophical styles shows, I hope, is that the views of others do make a difference.
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